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THE LONGEVITY OF AMERICAN TERRORISTS: 
FACTORS AFFECTING SUSTAINABILITY 
 
I.  PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT 
This project was an outgrowth of two previous NIJ projects being conducted under NIJ’s 
Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism program area.  The 
first of these projects, which ended in 2015, focused upon testing one of the most prominent 
theoretical models of extremist radicalization -- identity and framing theory.1  One of the 
findings from examination of this theoretical model is consistent with the notion that “people 
want to be associated with a winner.”  Recruitment and commitment, crucial to the lifespan of 
any terrorist movement, improve when the movement has been able to commit successful 
terrorist incidents (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi, 2009), particularly if the offenders escaped 
unscathed.  In the second project, which focused upon the temporal sequencing of terrorists’ 
precursor behaviors,2 a somewhat serendipitous finding emerged to crystalize the current issue. 
A preliminary analysis of the differences between “lone actors” and members of “cells or 
groups” revealed that lone actors “survived” substantially longer than members of cells or groups 
before being arrested or indicted.  Although we later found this relationship to be spurious, it was 
worthy of further examination. 
It distinctly appeared that the greater the length of time between the commission of a 
terrorist incident by an individual terrorist (or cell) and their capture, the greater the attraction 
to likeminded recruits who are wavering in their commitment to the cause and not yet 
radicalized to violence.  If longevity – the ability to commit acts of terrorism and evade capture – 
                                               
1 NIJ Grant #2012-ZA-BX-0003, “Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activity, and the 
Radicalization Process.” 
2 NIJ Grant # 2013-ZA-BX-0001, “Sequencing Terrorists’ Precursor Behaviors: A Crime-
Specific Analysis.” 
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has a positive impact on recruiting to radicalization, it becomes critical for law enforcement to 
resolve terrorism cases as quickly as possible (see Jones and Libicki, 2008).  To accomplish this, 
we needed a better understanding of the factors that are associated with the survivability and 
sustainability of individual terrorists and, if affiliated, the manner in which they interact with 
their associates. 
Unfortunately, it is not an issue that has been frequently discussed.  Over the past twenty 
years, the P.I. has attended and participated in numerous Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 
(ATAC) and JTTF meetings, state and local anti-terrorism training sessions, and training for law 
enforcement personnel on pre-incident indicators of terrorism.  The importance of the training 
provided by these entities is unquestioned.  However, an examination of what terrorists are 
doing “right” is rarely mentioned.  Instead, we routinely utilize a case study of a successful 
interdiction to describe the successful tactics that led us to be able to make an arrest and 
indictment.  Our failures -- in this case, what terrorists are doing to successfully avoid capture -- 
are seldom the topic of discussion.  This project was intended to identify factors and behaviors 
that terrorists had engaged in that significantly improved their chances for avoiding arrest. 
Although there has been some discussion of the sustainability of terrorist groups in the 
empirical literature (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi, 2009; Crenshaw, 1988; Rapoport, 1992; 
Hoffman, 1998), the focus of most of this research has been on the strategic decision making of 
terror groups relative to target selection and delivery method rather than the tactical measures 
taken to avoid capture. More recently, Suttmoeller, Chermak, and Freilich (2017) examined 
factors associated with longevity relative to the extent of violence utilized among far-right 
groups. Despite this exceptional work, we found no quantitative examinations of longevity and 
sustainability at the individual level. With the advent of uncoordinated violence models in the 
Final Summary Overview 
3  
1990s (e.g., leaderless resistance, lone actor terrorism, etc.), understanding the behavior of 
terrorists not affiliated with terror groups has also become increasingly important.   
For this project, we focused on five factors associated with individual longevity 
mentioned either in the literature, as anecdotal information discussed by investigators and 
prosecutors, or correlates found to be associated with group longevity.  These included: 1) the 
possible effects of changes in the Attorney General’s Guidelines for terrorism investigations; 2) 
the impact of ideology, which may have indirectly affected longevity through gender, age, target 
selection, and mode of operation characteristics; 3) lone actors versus group participation; 4) the 
extent of participation in preparatory activity; and 5) the sophistication of the terrorism incidents 
in which the person participated. Incidental to this examination, one additional factor emerged -- 
the ability of terrorists to cross international boundaries. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Data used in the analysis were compiled from the American Terrorism Study (ATS), an 
Oracle 11g relational database composed of fifteen tables that includes information on the 
demographic characteristics of terrorism offenders, federal charges and other legal variables, the 
geocoded locations of perpetrator’s residences, pre-incident activities such as meetings and 
precursor crimes, terrorism incidents in the United States, and temporal data on many of the 
precursor activities and plotted incidents.  A description of the ATS database, the method and 
sample used in this project, and the types of analyses conducted are provided in the following 
subsections. 
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Sources of Data 
The American Terrorism Study (ATS) is a compilation of data primarily derived from the 
federal criminal court records of persons indicted for “terrorism or terrorism-related activities” 
for the period 1980-present.  In 1987, the FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analysis Center3 
provided the principal investigator with the names of persons indicted under the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism (CT) Program.  After the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing in 1995, 
the FBI, NIJ, and the P.I. collaborated with the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Crime in which the House Subcommittee assumed sponsorship of the ATS.  In 
2002, the Senate Judiciary Committee assumed this role under Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL).  
From 2005-2012, the names of international terrorists indicted in federal courts were provided 
through the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).  Since that time, the names of domestic 
terrorists have been extracted primarily from the websites of U.S. Attorneys offices and other 
public sources.  As such, the persons included in the database are indicative of the FBI’s official 
definition of terrorism (e.g., see FBI, 1998).  Since the FBI has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
investigation of acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or property, the ATS includes only 
individuals and cases prosecuted in federal criminal courts. 
Over the past fifteen years, the ATS has expanded from approximately 70 variables 
related to group affiliation, ideology, demographics, and legal and sentencing variables to over 
400 variables that include information on the geospatial and temporal distribution of the pre-
incident (or precursor) activities of these defendants leading up to a planned or completed 
terrorism incident.  Older cases already in the ATS were revisited to collect data on additional 
variables. 
                                               
3 Later renamed the Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit. 
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Data for the Current Quantitative Analysis 
At the time of the current project, the ATS included 1,140 case studies linked to 1,425 
federal “terrorism-related” court cases involving 1,922 indictees.  Data collection was complete 
on 605 terrorism incidents in the United States from 1980 to present. Analyses were limited to 
the 693 indicted individuals in the ATS who were linked to the planning or completion of a 
terrorist attack in the United States.4  To determine an individual’s “longevity,” the date of the 
person’s involvement in their first preparatory activity as well as a “neutralizing” date (usually 
date of arrest) were required to determine the duration of their “terrorist lifespan.”  Sufficient 
information to establish longevity (a “start” and “stop” date) was available on 346 persons in the 
dataset, with connected incidents ranging from 1980 to 2015. 
(Table 1 here) 
A description of the variables and the manner in which they were measured is provided in 
Table 1.  Additional comment on coding of the dependent variable and one of the independent 
variables is warranted.  First, individual longevity has not been used in previous research.  
Therefore, we utilized findings from prior literature on group longevity to help determine how 
individual longevity should be categorized. Several studies have noted that the average terrorist 
group lasted for about one year (Rappoport, 1992; LaFree and Dugan, 2009; see also 
Suttmoeller, Chermak, and Freilich, 2017).  The shortest category is six months, half of what 
“average group longevity” has been estimated in previous research. A second category captures 
six months less and six months more than the average lifespan of the group. The third category 
included persons who participated in terroristic events from 18-36 months. The longest category 
                                               
4 Eliminated persons had been indicted on charges related to material support, conspiracy, and other charges not 
related to a specific planned or completed incident. 
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is “greater than three years,” which is three times the average group longevity. Furthermore, it 
appeared that “greater than three years” was significantly distinct from the other categories.  
Second, we wanted to ascertain if changes in the Attorney General’s Guidelines on 
Terrorism Investigations were related to the longevity of individual terrorists.  While the FBI’s 
definition of terrorism has not changed over the past forty years, major changes to the 
“regulatory” definition, as provided by the AG Guidelines, have taken place on at least four 
occasions during this period.  These changes occurred during Levi, Smith, Ashcroft, and 
Mukasey tenures as Attorney General.  Measurement of this variable involved identifying under 
which set of Guidelines an individual terrorist committed their first participation in a recorded 
terrorist incident.  These behaviors usually involved the person’s first preparatory behavior 
recorded in the ATS.  This date was then used to assign the person to one of the four Guideline 
eras from which mean and median values were calculated.  More details on this variable are 
provided in the results and discussion sections. 
 
III. MAJOR FINDINGS 
 
Longevity was measured with two different indicators of central tendency.  The mean 
longevity for terrorists in the sample was 32.4 months.  Interestingly, when using the median as 
an indicator, the average longevity of individual terrorists drops to 15.86 months, a figure very 
consistent with the estimated average lifespan of terrorist groups identified in previous research.  
A summary of the distribution of these offenders across this variable is provided in Table 2.  The 
sample is fairly evenly distributed across our four longevity categories.  Nearly one-third of the 
terrorists 29.8%, 103 of 346) “survived” six months or less before arrest, while at the other 
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extreme, one-fourth (25.4%, 88 of 346) of the sample was recorded as having longevity in excess 
of three years. It is this latter group that we were most interested in. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Major Finding 1:  Major changes to the Attorney General Guidelines combatting 
terrorism have been associated with significant declines in the “lifespan” of individual 
terrorists.  As previously discussed, major changes to the manner in which terrorists were 
investigated occurred during the tenures of four Attorneys General:  Edward Levi (1975-1977), 
William F. Smith (1981-1985), John Ashcroft (2001-2005), and Michael Mukasey (2007-2009).  
Although there were a number of Attorneys General between each of these individuals, the 
changes these AG’s initiated during their tenures lasted for many years.  The era reflecting the 
effect of the Levi Guidelines, therefore, extends from 1976 when he issued the Guidelines until 
new guidelines were instituted by William French Smith in 1983.  The Smith era extended to the 
beginning of the Ashcroft guidelines created after the September 11, 2001 attacks.  The Ashcroft 
guidelines remained in effect until new guidelines were created by Michael Mukasey.  The 
Mukasey guidelines basically remain in effect today.  Although minor modifications to the 
guidelines on terrorism investigations may have been implemented by other AG’s between the 
tenures of these four Attorneys General, the changes were mostly semantic.   
(Table 3 here) 
Terrorists who began their “careers” during each of these eras have remarkably different 
longevities (See Table 3).  Terrorists who began during the Levi era had a mean longevity of 
2,230 days.  The impact of Watergate, COINTELPRO, and the Privacy Act on FBI investigative 
strategies are demonstrated in the Levi Guidelines and manifested in the ability of terrorists 
during this era to operate almost with impunity.  Introduction of the Smith Guidelines in March 
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1983 significantly altered the ability and focus of the FBI in responding to terrorism.  The 
median lifespan of terrorists who began operating during the mid-1980s plummeted from 2,230 
days to 1,067 days.  This downward trend has continued as new guidelines have given law 
enforcement more discretion in the investigative techniques employed.  As of 2015, terrorists 
who began committing terrorism or terrorism-related activities following introduction of the 
Mukasey Guidelines have only had a mean longevity of 142 days, and a median longevity of 99 
days. This pattern is presented visually in five-year increments in Figures 1 and 2 below. 
(Figure 1 and Figure 2 here) 
Major Finding 2:  The longevity of individual terrorists varies significantly by ideology.  
Environmental and Far-Left terrorists sustained themselves for substantially longer periods of 
time than did Far-Right or Islamic Extremists.  As Table 4 reveals, Far-Left and Environmental 
terrorists averaged 5.4 and 4.3 years, respectively.  In contrast, the longevity of Far-Right and 
Islamic Extremists was, on average, two years or less.  These differences reflect a variety of 
influences.  The Far Left, prominent during the Levi Guidelines era, had several terrorists who 
avoided arrest for nearly a decade before their capture following implementation of the Smith 
Guidelines.  Members of the United Freedom Front are prime examples.  The ability of some Far 
Left and Environmental terrorists to cross international boundaries further contributed to their 
longevity.  Joanne Chesimard (Black Liberation Army), Victor Gerena (Macheteros), and 
William Morales (FALN) all evaded capture by escaping to a foreign country.  The longevity of 
some Far Left and Environmental terrorists continues to this day, due to their fugitive status.  In 
contrast, the Far-Right and Islamic Extremists emerged at a time when the implementation of 
new AG guidelines (Smith and Mukasey, respectively), negatively impacted the life course of 
these terrorists.  The most dramatic increases in terrorism indictments and arrests over the past 
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forty years occurred at two points in our history:  1) immediately after the implementation of the 
Smith AG Guidelines in 1983 (when the Far-Right declared “War in ‘84”) and 2) in 2002 when 
implementation of the Ashcroft Guidelines and the PATRIOT Act following the September 11, 
2001 attacks resulted in a significant increase in indictments for international terrorists involved 
in “material support.” 
(Table 4 here) 
Major Finding 3:  Ideology also plays an indirect role in longevity due to its 
relationship with other variables.  Gender and Educational attainment are significantly related to 
longevity. As Table 5 reveals, a slightly higher percentage of females than males (38.6% vs 
23.5%, respectively) may be categorized as having “very long” longevity (longer than three 
years), while the percentage of males classified as having “short” longevity (six months or less) 
is twice as high as that for females (31.8% vs. 15.9%, respectively).  To some extent this may be 
attributed to the roles of women in terrorist groups.  Female terrorists have tended toward two 
types of roles, either leadership roles among Far Left groups or in support roles among Far Right 
and Islamic Extremist groups.  Both of these role types are associated with longer longevity.  
Males, in contrast, have been more likely to engage in overtly criminal preparatory behavior as 
well as actual incident participation than females.  Both of these types of behaviors are 
significantly more likely to attract the attention of law enforcement. 
(Table 5 here) 
Furthermore, the greater one’s educational attainment, the longer terrorists have been 
able to avoid indictment.  This general pattern manifests itself both among groups and lone 
actors and is also a function of group ideology.  Leftist terrorists, who dominated American 
terrorism statistics during the Levi Guidelines era, where also characterized as having a 
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substantially larger proportion of females in leadership roles, many of whom were college 
graduates.  The same was true of environmental terrorists during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
Even among the Far Right, leaders such as Louis Beam, Richard Butler, and Robert Miles were 
well educated, and while they did not avoid indictment, they successfully avoided conviction. 
Major Finding 4:  The type of terrorist incident planned or committed is highly related 
to longevity in two fundamental ways:  1) as a result of the sophistication of the incident, and 2) 
as a result of the extent of preparation necessary to carry out the incident.  These findings are 
summarized in Table 6 below.  First, one of the most significant findings involves the 
sophistication of the terrorist incident committed, albeit efforts to measure sophistication, 
including ours, can be somewhat arbitrary.  Despite this, the less sophisticated the planned or 
committed attack, the longer the longevity of the individual terrorists involved in the incident. 
There may be a number of reasons for this relationship that we were not able to measure.  It may 
be that more sophisticated incidents result in the greater allocation of law enforcement resources; 
or it may be that more sophisticated explosive devices provide better forensic evidence to be 
used in solving the crime.  While both of these contentions may be true, we were able to measure 
two other indicators relative to sophistication that may be associated with the relationship 
between sophistication and longevity.  
(Table 6 here) 
It was our contention that the more sophisticated the planned incident: 1) the greater the 
number of meetings (if it involved multiple offenders) would be required during the planning 
process; and 2) the greater the number of preparatory activities would be necessary to complete 
the incident.  Both of these types of activities (number of meetings and preparatory activities) 
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have been found to be negatively related to the successful completion of terrorist incidents,5  
suggesting that early intervention and/or arrest were also linked to these two variables.  As 
expected, both of these relationships were significantly related to longevity in the direction 
predicted.  The more meetings that were held in advance of the incident and the more 
preparatory behaviors committed per incident, the shorter the longevity of the individual 
terrorist. 
Finally, we specifically examined some of the terrorists who were outliers – those who 
had “survived” the longest without being arrested or captured.  These included Joanne 
Chesimard (Black Liberation Army), Victor Gerena (Macheteros), William Morales (FALN), 
Elizabeth Duke (May 19th Communist Party), and three members of the environmental group 
known as “the family “—Josephine Overaker, Joseph Dibbee, and Rebecca Rubin.  Chesimard 
(aka Assata Shatur) escaped from prison in 1979 and resurfaced in Cuba.  She remains there 
today.  William Morales also escaped from custody in 1979, made his way to Mexico, where he 
resurfaced in 1983 during a shootout with Mexican authorities.  He was convicted in Mexico on 
charges related to the shooting, but was granted permission to emigrate to Cuba, despite U. S. 
extradition efforts.  The escapes of both of these individuals have been attributed to Marilyn 
Buck, leader of the May 19th Communist Party.  She died in 2010, following her release from 
federal prison the previous month.  Also affiliated with this group was Elizabeth Duke, who 
remains a fugitive, whereabouts unknown.  Cuban exile has been a successful strategy to avoid 
incarceration for Chesimard, Morales, and Victor Gerena,  a member of the Macheteros who 
robbed the Wells Fargo depot in Hartford, Connecticut in 1983. All three remain in Cuba as of 
this writing. 
                                               
5 See Smith et al., Sequencing Terrorists’ Precursor Behaviors:  A Crime Specific Analysis.  
Final Summer Overview, NIJ Award # 2013-ZA-BX-0001. 
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Others with extremely long longevity include three members of the environmental group 
known as “the family,” with ties to both ALF (Animal Liberation Front) and ELF (Earth 
Liberation Front).  These include Josephine Overaker, who was indicted in 2006, but has never 
been captured.  She is believed to be overseas.  Rebecca Rubin, also indicted in 2006, was 
originally from Canada and fled there after her indictment.  She turned herself in at the U.S. 
border in 2012 and was released from prison in 2016.  Joseph Dibbee, who had been a fugitive 
since his indictment in 2004, was arrested in Cuba while on his way to Russia in August, 2018.  
The most common attribute of these persons with extreme longevity involved a leftist or 
anarchist ideology and the utilization of international boundaries to evade capture. 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
While the FBI has shied away from domestic intelligence gathering since the Watergate 
era, more recent iterations of Attorney General Guidelines have provided the FBI with additional 
tools, allowing them to intervene earlier in suspected terrorism cases.  Our findings seem to 
suggest that strategic changes in policy and practice have resulted in shortening the longevity of 
terrorists in the United States.  In particular, the post-9/11 Ashcroft and Mukasey-era Guidelines 
cleared some bureaucratic red tape for FBI field offices to follow leads, initiate terrorism 
investigations, and monitor suspects for longer periods of time.  Also since 9/11, the U.S.A. 
Patriot Act empowered federal investigators to open assessments and secretly surveil terrorism 
suspects, such as by monitoring private communications and financial transactions. In short, 
changes in Attorney General Guidelines have seemingly played some role in keeping the 
American public safe by equipping law enforcement with the ability to more effectively mitigate 
terrorist threats.  
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Changes in Attorney General Guidelines over the last several decades have loosely 
aligned with shifts in the nature of American terrorism and the threats posed by distinct types of 
groups and lone actors.  Our research shows that estimations of how long terrorists survive 
depends in large part on the ideological movement to which terrorists adhere.  We know, for 
instance, that the average longevity of extreme leftists and environmental terrorists has been 
elongated in part due to a select number of terrorists traveling overseas and evading arrest.  As 
these terrorists are usually of relatively higher social status, they have the means and social 
capital for international travel and utilizing protective networks of likeminded extremists.  
Perhaps the evasion of arrest by suspected terrorists fleeing the country has become more 
challenging in the modern era of homeland security, helping to explain why the longevity of 
terrorists has decreased over time.  Therefore, we can conclude that the U.S. counterterrorism 
strategy not only requires closely monitoring suspected terrorists who seek entry to the country, 
but also to those who seek to flee it.  In addition to international travel, left-wing and 
environmental terrorists may endure increased longevity because of their modus operandi, in 
particular their historical reluctance to commit lethal, mass casualty attacks which may come 
with higher risks of detection by authorities.  In other words, the approach of left-wing and 
environmental terrorists are more reflective of guerilla warfare tactics designed to methodically 
wear down the enemy, unique from other terrorists who stage high-profile terrorist spectaculars.  
Our study also revealed that terrorists who plan and execute less sophisticated attacks 
survive longer. One relatively straightforward explanation is that the weapons used in less 
sophisticated attacks are usually purchased legally and are easily obtainable by terrorists without 
raising the suspicions of law enforcement or other possible witnesses. More elaborate attacks, 
such as those involving bombings or the use of CBRN materials, often require research, training, 
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and testing – all activities that increase risks of detection due to being digitally or physically 
traceable.  While tracking the purchase of some weapons used by terrorists (e.g., paint, hand 
tools) would be untenable, restricting access to moderately sophisticated weapons like firearms 
for persons on terrorist watchlists is a viable approach to reducing the longevity of some 
terrorists.  Furthermore, as terrorists’ preparatory activities may occur across jurisdictional 
boundaries, enhancing federal, state, local, and tribal intelligence sharing capabilities will remain 
critical to thwarting these less sophisticated plots.    
Unfortunately, though perhaps not surprisingly, our findings tell us that terrorists who 
successfully survive the longest provide law enforcement the fewest opportunities to intervene in 
their plots.  Terrorists who meet with others less frequently and commit fewer preparatory acts 
are able to carry on longer prior to their eventual arrest and indictment.  As such, the public 
arguably holds some responsibility for reporting suspicious, yet not necessarily criminal, 
behaviors observed both in-person and online to local law enforcement.  Continued efforts to 
inform the public though informational campaigns, like the well-known “see something, say 
something” campaign, are necessary to prime the public’s attention and willingness to notify 
authorities when something seems out place or abnormal. The U.S. has undoubtedly constructed 
a formidable homeland security apparatus responsible for preventing terrorists attacks since 9/11. 
However, an alert public and interconnected system of federal, state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement agencies capable of connecting the dots will be needed to curtail the longevity of 
terrorists operating in the U.S. in years to come.  
 
 
 
 
Final Summary Overview 
15  
Scholarly Products 
 
Smith, B. L., K. D. Damphousse, and J. Gruenewald.  Patterns of American Terrorism.  New 
York:  Routledge Press.  Forthcoming, 2018. 
 
Smith, B.L., K. Ratcliff. “An Overview of the American Terrorism Study.” Invited presentation 
to the International Assoication of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts Ozarks Chapter 
meeting, 9/6/18. 
 
Smith, B.L., K. Ratcliff. “Select Findings from the American Terrorism Study.” Invited 
presentation to the Arkansas Joint Terrorism Task Force Executive meeting, 9/12/18. 
 
Smith, B.L., K. Ratcliff. “An Overview of the American Terrorism Study.” Invited presentation 
to the Arkansas Fusion Center/DHS Liason Officers Conference, 7/6/18. 
 
Brice, M., B. L. Smith, J. Gruenewald, G. Drawve. “Factors Affecting the Longevity of 
Individual Terrorists.” Master’s Thesis. May 2018. University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. 
 
Smith, B.L. “Variations in Trends and Patterns among Radicalized Persons.” Invited presentation 
to the Arkansas Fusion Center/DHS Liaison Officers Conference, 4/7/17. 
 
Brice, M. and B.L. Smith. “Measuring Factors Contributing to Longevity in Terrorist Activity.” 
American Society of Criminology. November 16, 2017. Philadelphia, PA. 
 
Brice, M., B. L. Smith, C. A. Shields. “Examining the Longevity of Individuals in Terrorist 
Groups.” Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. Spring 2017. Kansas City, MO. 
 
Jackson, S. and C. A. Shields. "ISIS in American Courts," Paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the American Society of Criminology. November 15-19, 2016.  New Orleans, LA. 
 
Brice, M., B. L. Smith. “Factors Affecting the Longevity of Individual Terrorists.” Department 
of Homeland Security Fellow poster presentation.  2016. 
 
Ratcliff, K. and C. A. Shields.  "Examining Terrorist Pre-Incident Affirmation Behaviors." Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology. November 15-19, 
2016, New Orleans, LA
Final Summary Overview 
16  
REFERENCES 
 
Crenshaw, M. 1988. “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational 
Approaches.” Pp. 13-31 in D.C. Rapoport (ed.) Inside Terrorist Organizations. New 
York: Columbia University Press.  
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1998.  Terrorism in the United States, 1997. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.   
Freilich, J.D., Chermak, S.M., and Caspi, D. 2009. “Critical Events in the Life 
Trajectories of Domestic Extremist White Supremacist Groups: A Case Study Analysis 
of Four Violent Organizations.” Criminology and Public Policy, 8(3):497-530.  
Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan , "Research on Terrorism and Countering 
Terrorism," Crime and Justice 38 (2009): 413-477. 
Jones, S. and M. Libicki. 2008. How Terrorist Groups end: Lessons for Countering al 
Qaeda. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.  
Rapoport, D.C. 1992. “Terrorism.” In Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (eds.) 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, Volume II. London: Routledge.  
Smith, Brent L.  and Kelly R. Damphousse.  1996. “Punishing Political Offenders:  The 
Effect of Political Motive on Federal Sentencing Decisions.”  Criminology.  34(3): 289-
322. 
Smith, Brent L., David Snow, Kevin Fitzpatrick, Kelly R. Damphousse, and Paxton 
Roberts. 2016.  “Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activity, and the Radicalization 
Process.” Final Report to the National Institute of Justice for award # 2012-ZA-BX-0003. 
Smith, Brent L., Jeff Gruenewald, Kelly R. Damphousse, Paxton Roberts. 2017. 
“Sequencing Terrorists’ Precursor Behaviors: A Crime-Specific Analysis.” Final Report 
to the National Institute of Justice for award #2013-ZA-BX-0001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Final Summary Overview 
17  
Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table 1: Variables 
Variable Measure Notes 
Education Highest known education level at career 
beginning 
Coded into three 
categories: up to a high 
school education, above 
high school (e.g. bachelors 
or some 
professional/vocational 
school), and above 
undergraduate (e.g. some 
post-graduate education) 
Gender Sex, male or female 
 
Longevity Length of time in days from the 
individual’s first known preparatory 
behavior to the time of their neutralizing 
arrest 
Longevity is grouped 
into four categories: short 
(0-6 months), moderate (6-
18 months), long (18 
months to 3 years), and very 
long (over 3 years) 
Ideology Individual’s ideological category Categories include Far-
left, Far-right, 
Environmental, and Islamic 
Extremist 
Lone Actor Type Highest incident level of participatory 
involvement 
Based on individual’s 
involvement across 
incidents, collapsed into 
participation as a group or 
loner – e.g. if an individual 
participated in one incident 
alone and another as a 
group, their lone actor type 
is coded as group  
Preparatory 
Average 
Number of preparatory activities linked 
to person divided by number of incidents 
over career 
 
Meetings 
Average 
Number of preparatory meetings linked 
to that person divided by number of linked 
incidents over career 
 
Sophistication Highest level of incident sophistication 
individual linked to over career 
Sophistication is coded 
into least, moderately, and 
most sophisticated 
Guideline Era Era of Attorney General Guidelines 
individual’s career began in 
A.G. guidelines are 
broken into four eras: Levi 
(1976-82), Smith (1983-00), 
Ashcroft (2001-05), and 
Mukasey (2006-present) 
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Table 2: Longevity Descriptives 
 N % Mean Days (Months) 
Median Days 
(Months) 
Short 103 29.8 75 (2.5) 72 (2.4) 
Moderate 85 24.6 341 (11.4) 338 (11.3) 
Long 70 20.2 790 (26.3) 758 (25.3) 
Very Long 88 25.4 2779 (92.6) 1902 (63.4) 
Total 346 100.0 973 (32.4) 469 (15.86) 
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Table 3: Guideline Era Descriptives 
 N Median Days Mean Days 
Levi 22 2888 2230 
Smith 244 548 1067 
Ashcroft 37 338 561 
Mukasey 39 99 142 
Total 342 476 981 
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Table 4: Longevity by Ideology 
 N Median Days Mean Days 
Far-left 46 729 1989 
Far-right 159 271 672 
Environmental 53 883 1591 
Islamic Extremist 88 382 612 
Total 346 469 973 
 
 
 
Table 4 Alternate Chart 
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Table 5: Perpetrator Characteristics 
  % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n)  
  Short Moderate Long Very Long Sig. 
       
Gender      .055 
Male  31.8 (96) 25.2 (76) 19.5 (59) 23.5 (71)  
Female  15.9 (7) 20.5 (9) 25.0 (11) 38.6 (17)  
       
Education      .032 
High School  40.2 (41) 18.6 (19) 21.6 (22) 19.6 (20)  
College  25.8 (34) 30.3 (40) 22.7 (30) 21.2 (28)  
Post-Graduate  14.3 (3) 19.0 (4) 23.8 (5) 42.9 (9)  
       
Ideology      .000 
Far-left  10.9 (5) 8.7 (4) 43.5 (20) 37.0 (17)  
Far-right  35.8 (57) 25.2 (40) 18.9 (30) 20.1 (32)  
Environmental  20.8 (11) 22.6 (12) 9.4 (5) 47.2 (25)  
Islamic Extremist  34.1 (30) 33.0 (29) 17.0 (15) 15.9 (14)  
Table 6: Incident Characteristics 
  % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n)  
  Short Moderate Long Very Long Sig. 
       
Lone Actor Type      .987 
Loner  36.4 (8) 22.7 (5) 13.6 (3) 27.3 (6)  
Group  35.7 (81) 26.0 (59) 13.7 (31) 24.7 (56)  
       
Preparatory Average      .037 
1 – 8 acts  27.8 (69) 21.8 (54) 20.6 (51) 29.8 (74)  
9 acts  29.9 (23) 32.5 (25) 23.4 (18) 14.3 (11)  
       
Meetings Average      .014 
0  24.5 (35) 25.9 (37) 27.3 (39) 22.4 (32)  
1  30.2 (29) 19.8 (19) 12.5 (12) 37.5 (36)  
2+  34.1 (31) 26.4 (24) 19.8 (18) 19.8 (18)  
       
Incident Sophistication      .000 
Least  28.6 (18) 11.1 (7) 6.3 (4) 54.0 (34)  
Moderately  43.8 (14) 34.4 (11) 9.4 (3) 12.5 (4)  
Most  37.3 (57) 30.1 (46) 17.0 (26) 15.7 (24)  
Final Summary Overview 
22  
3599
1577 1602
790 768
1269
597
446
96
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1970-1
975
1976-1
980
1981-1
985
1986-1
990
1991-1
995
1996-2
000
2001-2
005
2006-2
010
2011-2
015
Figure 1: Mean Longevity By 5-Year Intervals
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Figure 2: Median Longevity by 5-Year Intervals
